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FOREWORD
As all of its fifteen predecessors, the Sixteenth Volume of the Croatian Arbitration 
Yearbook contains a set of papers, which give a comprehensive and critical analysis 
of different issues in the field of arbitration and mediation. 
The first section dedicated to arbitration is focused to arbitration and State courts 
and consists of four articles. The first elaborates on public policy as a ground for 
setting aside an arbitral award and submits that the notion of public policy in a 
setting aside procedure should be interpreted in the same manner as in the case 
of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and not so as mean „all 
mandatory rules“ of the annulment State. The second paper analyses whether  party 
autonomy in international arbitration is capable of shaping judicial intervention in 
arbitral proceedings or at the stage of legal remedies against an arbitral award and 
emphasises that a balance between party autonomy and judicial intervention must 
be struck. The third paper also reflects the role of the judiciary in arbitral proceed-
ings, however it focuses on legal assistance by State courts to arbitral tribunals and 
purports to define the most effective model of their legal assistance to arbitral tribu-
nals. The fourth paper deals with the very concrete engagement of State courts  and 
that is, the judicial review of arbitral awards under the Croatian Arbitration Act on 
the occasion of a claim for the annulment of an arbitral award, at the enforcement 
stage, as an incidental issue in separate civil proceedings and when declaring the 
enforceability of the domestic award as a specific form of its recognition. 
The second section on arbitration presents selected issues of international arbi-
tration. The first two papers explore the notion of arbitrability. The first paper 
examines on a comparative level and from the viewpoint of Croatian law, the arbi-
trability of disputes between investors and listed companies for the breach of duty 
to disclose information on the capital market. The second paper deals with public 
private partnerships in the Republic of Croatia and indicates the advantages of the 
settlement of disputes arising out of public private partnership contracts through 
arbitration. The third paper reflects on the very hot issue in contemporary arbitra-
tion – the challenge of arbitrators. The paper examines how to balance the parties’ 
right to challenge an arbitrator and the arbitrators’ duty of disclosure which are key 
to ensuring the integrity of arbitral proceedings. The fourth paper reveals the devel-
opment of arbitration in the region and concerns the newest development in Slovene 
4arbitration law. A common denominator of the next three papers is that they focus 
on international conventions and arbitration – the CISG, BITs and the New York 
Convention. The first paper presents the application of Articles 1 and 10 of the UN 
Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods before tribunals organized 
under the Rules of the Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration at the Serbian Chamber 
of Commerce. The second paper refers to provisions in Croatian BITs on jurisdic-
tion of different bodies for the settlement of investment disputes, especially those 
provisions which prescribe prior mandatory mediation and subsequent elective 
jurisdictions of different bodies. The third paper analyses the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign arbitral awards and state succession and explores whether the 
bilateral agreement concluded in 1959 between the former Yugoslavia and Greece 
that covers the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards remains applicable 
in the bilateral relations of Greece with successors States. The final paper addresses 
the activities of the Vienna International Arbitral Centre and puts emphasis on the 
implementation of co-operation agreements which the VIAC concluded with other 
arbitral institutions.
The block on mediation offers four articles. The first paper gives a concise analysis 
focused mainly on Croatian law, the main similarities and differences between the 
two principal methods of alternative resolution of private law disputes – mediation 
and arbitration. The second paper elaborates on some characteristics of mediation 
with a foreign element according to the Croatian Mediation Act of 2009, which 
amended the Act of 2003, and Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council of Europe of 2009 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and 
commercial matters. The second paper brings an analysis of mediation in adminis-
trative cases in Slovenia and reviews a successful „Tenetiše“ environmental media-
tion case. The third paper explores how the use of mediation can change a negative 
perception of the legal profession and how it can improve the traditional system of 
dispute resolution.
The abovementioned contents show that this Volume remains faithful to the CAY’s 
founding postulate – to cover arbitration and mediation at the national, regional and 
international level and thereby contribute to the critical analysis of different issues 
in focus in the field of arbitration and mediation.
GENERAL EDITOR
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Challenging Arbitrators and the Importance of Disclosure: 





The last few years have seen a rise in challenges to arbitrators. It is argued that challenges are a 
tactic resorted to by parties and their counsel to cause delay and increase the costs of arbitration 
and, thus, undermine the parties’ choice and the finality of awards. However, the right to challenge 
an arbitrator and the arbitrators’ duty of disclosure are key to ensuring the integrity of the arbitral 
process. 
This article examines how the balance is struck between these two objectives by looking at the na-
ture and the scope of the right to challenge arbitrators and the duty to disclose under national laws 
and rules of arbitral institutions. After reviewing recent national court cases and arbitral decisions 
concerning challenge, the article calls for (i) the threshold for challenging arbitrators in investment 
arbitrations to be, at the very least, the same as in international commercial arbitrations; (ii) a neu-
tral and independent body to be given the authority to review challenges under the ICSID system; 
and (ii) disclosure obligations to be imposed on counsel and the parties. 
Key words: challenge of arbitrators, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration, Croatian Arbitration Act, English Arbitration Act. Rules of Arbitration of the 
Permanent Arbitration Court attached to the Croatian Chamber of Economy, ICC 
Rules of Arbitration, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States
I.  Introduction
Arbitration is a voluntary and consensual mechanism for resolving disputes where-
by parties agree to opt out of the judicial process. one of the key distinguishing 
features of arbitration is the ability of the parties to choose the arbitrators who will 
resolve their dispute. The parties’ autonomy to select their arbitrators is one of the 
main advantages of international arbitration as compared to litigation1. A party will 
strive to select an arbitrator who has some inclination or predisposition to favour 
٭ Ana Stanič, LLM, LLB, Solicitor E&A, London.
1 Mistelis L., International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, [2004] 15 American 
Review of International Arbitration 525. See also Bühring-Uhle, A survey on Arbitration and 
Settlement in International Business Disputes in Drahozal C., Naimark R., Towards a Science of 
International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research, Kluwer International (2005), 25, at 33.
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that party’s side by, for example, sharing the same legal and/or cultural background 
or by holding doctrinal views that coincide with such party’s case. International 
arbitration conventions2, national laws3 and institutional arbitration rules4 on the 
whole accord parties broad autonomy in selecting arbitrators. 
Such autonomy is, however, not unrestricted. As an adjudicatory process arbitra-
tion cannot be totally detached from “fundamental principles that underpin most 
domestic legal systems and ultimately reflect the rule of law”5. These principles are 
typically enshrined in the constitutions of states and form part of their procedural 
public policy rules. In particular, Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) provides that the determination of civil rights and obligation 
must be “by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.  That ar-
bitrations taking place in countries signatories to the ECHR must comply with the 
requirements of Article 6 is beyond doubt6. As a general rule, national laws and 
institutional rules provide that arbitral proceedings must meet the fundamental 
requirements of fairness and justice. Specifically, duties are imposed on arbitrators 
to act fairly and impartially and in accordance with due process, parties are ac-
corded rights to challenge an arbitrator, as well as to challenge or deny recognition 
of awards on grounds of lack of due process. 
2 See for example Article IV(1)(b) of the 1961 European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration which provides that the parties “shall be free inter alia (i) to appoint arbitrators or to 
establish means for their appointment in the event of an actual dispute...”. The text of the European 
Convention is available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/europe.international.commercial.arbitration.
convention.geneva.1961. See also Articles II(3) and  V(1)(d) of the 1958 New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of foreign Arbitral Awards. The fact that the “the composition 
of the arbitral authority ... was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties” is one of only 
eight grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitral award. The text of the New York Convention is 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf.
3 See for example Article 11(2) of the Model Law, Article 10 of the CAA and Section 16 of the 
EAA. A few countries impose nationality and/or religious requirements on the parties’ choice of 
arbitrators. See for example paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules for the Implementation of the Saudi 
Arabian Arbitration Regulation, which provides that: “the arbitrator shall be a Saudi national or 
Muslim expatriate from the free professional section or others...”. for further discussion see Saleh 
S., Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East, Hart Publishing, (2nd edition, 2006), at 300. 
4 See for example Articles 5 to 8 of United Nations Convention on International Trade Law Ar-
bitration Rules (“UNCITRAL Rules”) and Articles 7 to 9 of the ICC Rules.  A few institutional 
arbitration rules impose greater limitations on parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators.  See for 
example Article 21 of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(“CIETAC”) Arbitration Rules which requires arbitrators to be selected from a list maintained 
by CIETAC unless otherwise confirmed by the Chairman of CIETAC. 
5 Qureshi K., Arbitration and Article 6, (2007) New L. J. 46, at 46. 
6 Albeit that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights provides that special 
considerations apply in relation to arbitration. for further detail see Qureshi, Ibid. 
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This article aims to provide in Sections 1 and 2 an overview of the rules adopted 
by states and arbitral institutions concerning challenge to arbitrators and the corol-
lary arbitrators’ duty to make disclosure in the context of international commercial 
and investment arbitrations. The scope and operation of the waiver of the right to 
challenge is examined in Section 3. In Section 4 Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest 
in International Arbitration (“IBA Guidelines”)7 adopted by the International Bar 
Association (“IBA”) to clarify and harmonise these rules are analysed. A selected 
number of recent reported cases concerning challenge of arbitrators are reviewed 
in Section 5. By way of conclusion, in Section 6 emerging trends arising from the 
recent cases are highlighted and recommendations advanced.
Specifically, the article examines and compares the provisions of the 1985 United 
Nations Convention on International Trade Law Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration (“Model Law”)8, the national laws of Croatia and England, as 
well as the arbitration rules of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce (“CCC”), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). Most countries in the world have 
used the Model Law as a template for drafting their national rules concerning 
arbitration. As such, the Model Law’s rules concerning the challenge of arbitra-
tors and the duty of disclosure are indicative of how these issues are addressed in 
contemporary arbitration legislation worldwide.
II. Challenging arbitrators
Recent years have seen a rise in the number of challenges to arbitrators. In this sec-
tion the grounds and procedure for challenging arbitrators under the selected laws 
and institutional rules are examined in turn, highlighting differences in approach. 
In particular, the scope of the threshold requirements of “justifiable doubt” and 
“material lack” and the differences between the “impartiality” and “independence” 
standards are discussed. 
a) Grounds of Challenge
Most national laws and rules of arbitral institutions allow parties to challenge ar-
bitrators for bias, as well as on other grounds. In this section, the grounds for chal-
lenge enumerated under the Model Law, 2001 Croatian Arbitration Act (“CAA”)9, 
7 IBA Guidelines are available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_
and_free_materials.aspx.
8 A copy of the Model Law with amendments adopted as at 2006 is available at  http://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf.
9 The Law was published in Croatian official Gazette 88/2001 of 11 october 2001 and came into 
force on 19 october 2001. The unofficial English translation of the Croatian Law on Arbitration 
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the 1996 English Arbitration Act (“EAA”)10, the arbitration rules of the CCC con-
cerning international commercial arbitration11 (“CCC Rules”), as well arbitration 
rules of the ICC12 (“ICC Rules”) and ICSID are analysed in turn. 
i) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
The Model Law provides in Article 12(2) that “[a]n arbitrator may be challenged 
only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality 
or independence, or if he does not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties”. 
No details of the kind of circumstances which give rise to justifiable doubts are set 
in the Model Law. 
According to Born to date there has been is “only limited judicial authority apply-
ing the Article 12(2) standard”13. one recent example is the 2007 decision of the 
German Court in oberlandesgericht frankfurt/Main in which the Court held that 
(i) the existence of a lease agreement between the chairman and the counsel for 
one of the parties; (ii) the close personal relationship between the chairman and the 
same counsel, evidenced by the fact that the counsel used the personal “du” rather 
than the impersonal “Sie” when addressing the chairman during the course of the 
arbitration, and (iii) the failure by the chairman to disclose any of these facts, “at 
least as a whole” (German: “jedenfalls in ihrer Gesamtheit ”) gave rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the impartiality or independence of the chairman under s.1036(II) of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure (which parallels Article 12(2) of the Model Law)14.
ii) Croatian Arbitration Act
Similarly, Article 12 of the CAA states that: “[a]n arbitrator may be challenged 
only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his independ-
ence or impartiality, or if the arbitrator does not possess qualifications agreed to 
was prepared by Dr. Uzelac and is available at http://hgk.biznet.hr/hgk/fileovi/180.pdf.
10 The text of the EAA is available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/ukpga_19960023_
en_1. 
11 for details of the CCC Rules see “Rules for resolving arbitral disputes with an international 
element before the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce”, the 
version of the rules in Croatian can be found at http://www.hgk.hr/wps/portal/!ut/p/.cmd/cl/.l/
hr?legacy WcmClippingUrl=http%3A%2f%2fhgk.biznet.hr%2fhgk%2ftekst3.php%3fa%3D
b%26page%3Dtekst%26id%3D221%26kid%3D264.
12 The Rules of arbitration of the ICC in force as from 1 January 1998 are available at http://www.
iccwbo.org/uploadedfiles/Court/Arbitration/other/rules_arb_english.pdf.
13 Born G., International Commercial Arbitration, Volume 1, Wolters Kluwer (2009), at 1466.
14 Marenkov D., Germany: standards applied by German courts in deciding on challenges to 
arbitrators, (2009) Int. A.L.R N9. 
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by the parties or if he fails to fulfil his duties specified in Article 11, paragraph 2 
of this Law”. Article 11 paragraph 2 provides that “[a]n arbitrator must conduct the 
arbitration with due expeditiousness and undertake measures on time in order to 
avoid any delay of the proceedings”. 
As such, as compared to the Model Law, the CAA provides an additional ground 
for challenging arbitrators – the failure to conduct the arbitration expeditiously 
and without delay. As is the case with the Model Law, the CAA does not define 
the impartiality and independence standards or provide any guidance as to what 
amounts to justifiable doubt. It would seem that no challenge has been made pursu-
ant to these rules to date. 
iii) English Arbitration Act
Under Section 24 of the EAA the following grounds for challenging an arbitrator 
are listed: (a) that circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality; (b) that he does not possess the qualifications required by the arbitra-
tion agreement; (c) that he is physically or mentally incapable of conducting the 
proceedings or that there are justifiable doubts as to his capacity to do so; and (d) 
that he has refused or failed (i) properly to conduct the proceedings or (ii) to use all 
reasonable despatch in conducting the proceedings or making an award.  Therefore, 
under the EAA the incapacity of the arbitrator and his/her failure to properly con-
duct proceedings are additional grounds for challenge as compared to the Model 
Law and the CAA. 
However, and importantly, Section 24 provides that a challenge will only be suc-
cessful if the above grounds will cause or have caused “substantial injustice” to the 
applicant will15. Accordingly, the ability of parties to challenge arbitrators is more 
restricted under English law than under the Model Law or the CAA. 
iv) Rules of Arbitration of the Permanent Arbitration Court attached to the 
Croatian Chamber of Economy 
Adopting a similar approach as the CAA, Article 15 of the CCC Rules provides 
that an arbitrator can be challenged if circumstances exist which could give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence. No other grounds for 
challenge are listed. 
15 See final sentence of Section 24(1). 
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v) ICC Rules of Arbitration
Unlike the rules of most other arbitral institutions around the world16, Article 7(1) 
of the ICC Rules does not specifically require an arbitrator to be impartial. Instead 
it requires the arbitrator to ‘‘be and remain independent of the parties involved in 
the arbitration’’17. Nevertheless, it can be argued that impartiality is a ground for 
challenge under the ICSID Rules. Since Article 15(2) expressly requires a tribunal 
to ‘‘act fairly and impartially’’18 by implication it could be argued the term “oth-
erwise” in Article 11, which provides that a challenge may be made for ‘‘lack of 
independence or otherwise”, includes impartiality as a ground for challenge. 
vi)  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States
Parties to an investment arbitration19 conducted under the ICSID system can chal-
lenge an arbitrator pursuant to Article 57 of the ICSID Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (“ICSID 
Convention”)20 for “manifest lack of qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 
14...” or “...on the ground that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal 
under Section 2 of Chapter IV”. Paragraph 1 of Article 14 requires the arbitrator 
to be of “high moral character”, have “recognised competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance and “exercise independent judgment”. Section 2 
of Chapter IV of the ICSID Convention sets out the requirements concerning the 
nationality of the arbitrators to be appointed to an ICSID tribunal.  
16 See for example Article 8(1) of the AAA International Arbitration Rules and Article 5(2) of the 
Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International Arbitrators. 
17 Similarly Swiss law imposes on arbitrators only an obligation to be independent. for details see 
Section 180(1)(c) of the Swiss Private International Law Act.  However, Malintoppi argues that 
the right to an impartial judge is guaranteed by the Swiss Constitution and has been consistently 
imposed on arbitrators by Swiss courts as a fundamental principle of public policy. See Malin-
toppi L. Arbitrators’ Independence and Impartiality in Muchlinski P., ortino f., and Schreuer 
C., Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, oxford University Press (2008) 789, at 
819 and footnote 69 referred therein. 
18 Malintoppi L., Ibid., 808. 
19 A distinction is generally made between international commercial arbitrations and investment 
treaty arbitrations. Investment treaty arbitrations are arbitrations between states and investors 
in which regulatory acts of states are reviewed to determine whether there has been a breach of 
the rights granted to investors under inter alia bilateral investment treaties. International com-
mercial arbitrations, on the other hand, are arbitrations whereunder commercial disputes are 
resolved. The majority of investment treaty disputes today are resolved under the ICSID system. 
20 Terms of the ICSID Convention are available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Staticfiles/
basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
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The ICSID Convention requires arbitrators to exercise independent judgement 
rather than be impartial and independent. There has been much discussion about 
the implications of this difference in terminology. According to Schreuer the IC-
SID requirement includes an implicit duty of impartiality and independence21. A 
review of the recent published decisions concerning the disqualification of arbitra-
tors (“Disqualification Decisions”) shows that these requirements have been used 
interchangeably by tribunals when analysing whether the particular circumstances 
in question triggered disqualification22.
b) Impartiality versus independence
As the preceding discussion reveals, the provisions of the CAA and the Model Law 
require arbitrators to be both impartial and independent, whilst the EAA23 requires 
them only to be impartial and the ICC only to be independent. However, a review 
of the decisions of national courts and legal writings shows that the standards of 
impartiality and independence are often used interchangeably when discussing the 
duties of arbitrators. 
Although Born argues that undue importance should not be given to the distinc-
tion between the two standards24, the decision to exclude “independence” from the 
EAA suggests that, at least, the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration 
Law (“DAC”) regarded the distinction as important. In its report DAC specifi-
cally considered the appropriateness of including both standards in the EAA. The 
DAC noted that it was not “persuaded ... that, in consensual arbitrations .... [the 
requirement of independence was] either required or desirable” and that “lack of 
independence, unless it gives rise to justifiable doubts about the impartiality of the 
arbitrator, is of no significance” 25. DAC’s decision not to include the standard of 
“independence” in the EAA was guided largely by its concern to ensure that the 
common practice adopted in the UK for arbitrators and counsel to come from the 
21 As Schreuer notes, the original draftesmen of the ICSID Convention considered that the impar-
tiality and independence of arbitrators was a given. See Schreuer C., The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, Cambridge University Press (2001) at 57.
22 See the approach taken by the tribunals in the Suez Case and Azurix Case discussed in Sections 
5. The same approach was taken by tribunal in the Second Proposal for Disqualification in the 
EDF v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/03/23 on June 2008 (unreported). 
23 England is not the only jurisdiction that has adopted this approach. Similarly, the 1999 Swedish 
Arbitration Act requires the arbitrator to be impartial only. Interestingly, paragraph 8 of the Act 
contains a list of examples of an arbitrator’s partiality. for further discussion see Born, Supra 
Note 14, op.cit., at 1473. 
24 Born, Ibid., at 1474.
25 See paragraph 101 of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, Report on the 
Arbitration Bill, february 1996, reprinted in (1997) 13 Arb. Int’l 275.   
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same set of barristers’ chambers would not be brought into question. on its view, a 
lack of independence of itself should not give rise to challenge and is only evidence 
of a lack of impartiality. So what is the difference between the two standards?
i) Independence
Independence is generally regarded as an objective and fact-based standard requir-
ing the arbitrator to be free from outside influence and pressure26. In determining 
whether an arbitrator is independent the arbitrator’s relationship, whether profes-
sional, business, familial or personal, with any of the arbitrating parties or any of 
their affiliates or counsel will be examined. Examples of professional relationships 
looked at include whether the arbitrator or a partner in the same law firm as the ar-
bitrator has acted or is acting as counsel, an employee, an adviser or as a consultant 
on behalf of one party. Whether the arbitrator or partner in the same law firm holds 
an executive or non-executive directorship in one of the parties to the arbitration 
or owns shares in such party are examples of business relationships examined27. 
familial relationship looked at include whether an arbitrator, partner or business 
associate is a spouse, parent, aunt, or cousin of one of the parties or counsels. Ex-
amples of personal relationship looked at include long-standing friendship between 
the arbitrator and a party or counsel28. 
However, the mere existence of a relationship between the arbitrator and one of the 
parties or the counsels does not necessarily lead to the existence of a relationship 
of dependency that would justify a challenge. The application of the independence 
standard across national courts and institutional rules is not uniform29. 
ii) Impartiality
By contrast to independence, impartiality is said to be a subjective standard con-
cerned with the arbitrator’s mental predisposition with respect to any of the arbi-
trating parties or the matter in dispute30. Partiality is typically established if there 
26 See Lew J., Mistelis L., Kröll, S., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer 
Law International (2003), at 261.
27 for a recent English case see Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfields Properties [2000] 1 All ER 65. 
for ICC practice see Craig W., Park W., Paulsson J., Guide to 1998  ICC Arbitration Rules with 
Commentary, oceana Publications (1999), para 13-05(iv). 
28 See German case referred to in Section 1.1.1. 
29 for further examples of different approaches taken by national courts and arbitral institutions 
see the recent cases discussed in Section 5. for details on IBA’s attempts to harmonise the ap-
plication of the standard of independence see Section 4. 
30 Trakman L., The impartiality and independence of arbitrators reconsidered, (2007) Int. ALR 
124, at 126.
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are justifiable doubts that the arbitrator will favour one party over the other for 
reasons that are unrelated to a reasoned decision on the merits of the case. These 
unrelated factors may include the relationships discussed in the paragraph above. 
It can also relate to statements made before or during the course of an arbitral 
proceeding which concerns the parties, the dispute in question or the legal issues 
raised in the proceedings or to conduct during proceedings31.  
c) The justifiable doubts requirement
Under the rules of most countries and arbitral institutions, including all of the ones 
reviewed in this article except those of ICSID, a challenge will only succeed if it is 
established that there are justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality and/or 
independence32.  The justifiable doubts requirement ensures that the parties do not 
make frivolous or vexatious challenges which would artificially prolong the arbitral 
proceedings undermining its efficacy. None of the rules examined defines what is 
meant by justifiable doubt. There are, therefore, significant ambiguities regarding 
the nature and scope of the requirement and its application varies from country to 
country and from one arbitral institution to another33. 
for example, it is not entirely clear whether justifiable doubt is distinguishable 
from reasonable doubt34. It can be argued that the justifiable doubts requirement 
contains both an objective and subjective element. Existence of doubt is to be 
assessed by reference to the particular party and the circumstances of the case 
(subjective element) to determine whether such doubt is justifiable to a reason-
able person who finds themselves in such circumstances (objective element)35. In 
an attempt to standardise the application of this requirement Standard 2(c) of the 
IBA Guidelines (discussed in further detail in Section 4) provides that “[d]oubts 
are justifiable if a reasonable and informed third party would reach the conclu-
sion that there was a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by facts 
other than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or her 
31 for example, the statement that “Portuguese people were liars” served as grounds to remove an 
arbitrator for partiality in Arbitration between the Owners of the Steamship Catalina and the 
Owners of the Motor Vessel Norma, Re (1938) 61 Lloyd’s. Rep. 360.
32 As noted in Section 1.1.3, the EAA imposes an additional requirement of substantial injustice 
to the party making the challenge. 
33 Some examples of how this requirement is applied in practice are examined in Section 5 by 
reference to recent cases on challenges.  
34 Trackman, Supra Note 31, at 132. The English courts have held that the justifiable doubt require-
ment is an objective test. for further discussion on the most recent decision see Section 5.
35 This approach has, for example, been taken by English Courts. See Porter v. Magill [2002] 2 
AC 357. 
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decision”36. In other words the IBA Guidelines take the view that there is no dif-
ference between the two requirements. As the cases reviewed in Section 5 reveal, 
English Courts and some ICSID tribunals have referred to the two requirements 
interchangeably.
further, in England, for example there was until recently some debate about whether 
justifiable doubt requires there to be a risk or possibility of partiality, or actual cer-
tainty or probability thereof37. However, in Porter v. Magill38 the House of Lords 
clarified that the test for impartiality is “whether, having regard to the relevant cir-
cumstances, as ascertained by the court a fair minded and informed observer, having 
considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal 
was biased”. This test was applied in the ASM Shipping case discussed in Section 5.1. 
d) The manifest lack requirement 
As noted above, to challenge an arbitrator under the ICSID Convention it must be 
shown that he or she manifestly lacks the quality of exercising independent judge-
ment. According to Schreuer the requirement that the lack of impartiality and/or 
independence must be manifest imposes a “relatively heavy burden on the party” 
making the proposal for disqualification39. 
This burden seems significantly higher than the “justifiable doubt” requirement 
previously discussed.  for example the Disqualification Decision in Amco Asia 
Corp. v. Indonesia40 held that the “mere appearance of partiality was not a sufficient 
ground for disqualification of the arbitrator. The challenging party had to prove not 
only facts indicating the lack of independence, but also that the lack is ‘manifest’ 
or ‘highly probable’, not just ‘possible’ or ‘quasi-certain’”41. Accordingly, it would 
seem that it is more difficult for a party to challenge an arbitrator in an investment 
treaty arbitration than in an international commercial arbitration. The implications 
of this will be explored further in Section 6.
36 See IBA Guidelines, Supra Note 8, at 10. 
37 For example in Laker Airways Inc v. FLS Aerospace Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 113 Rix J, applying the 
House of Lords test in R v. Gough [1993] 2 All E.R. 724, at 732, held that what was required 
was there to be a “real danger of bias”. Lord Wolf applied the same test in AT& T Corporation 
and Lucent Technologies Ltd v. Saudi Cable Company [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 625.
38 [2002] 2 AC 357.
39 Schreuer, Supra Note 22, op. cit., at 1200.
40 ICSID Case ARB/81/1, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator, 24 June 1982 
(“Amco Decision”) (unreported). Referred to in Tupman M., Challenge and Disqualification of 
Arbitrators in International Commercial Arsitration, (1989) 38 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 44, at 44. The 
case is also referred to in Schreuer C., Supra Note 22, op. cit., at 1200.
41 See Amco Decision, at 8.  
215
Croat. Arbit. Yearb. Vol. 16 (2009), pp. 205-235A. Stanič: Challenging Arb.and Duty of Disclosure
e) Procedure for challenge
There are a number of possible remedies available to a party once it is aware of 
circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to an arbitrator’s impartiality and/
or independence. first, the party can commence proceedings to remove or dis-
qualify an arbitrator. Second, the award itself may be challenged in the seat of the 
arbitration, which, if successful, would result in the award being set aside. finally, 
the party can resist enforcement of the award at the enforcement stage. This article 
only analyses this first procedure.
The procedure for challenging an arbitrator is governed by the law of the country of 
the seat of the arbitration and the rules of the arbitration that have been adopted by 
the parties42. This section compares the procedures for challenge under the various 
institutional rules and national laws enumerated above. 
i) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Under the Model Law, the parties are free to agree a procedure for challenging an 
arbitrator. failing such agreement, Article 13(2) stipulates that a party who intends 
to challenge an arbitrator must send a written statement of reasons for the challenge 
to the arbitral tribunal. In circumstances where the arbitrator who has been chal-
lenged does not withdraw after the challenge is made, the Model Law provides that 
it is the arbitral tribunal who will decide upon the challenge. There is no mention 
of the challenged arbitrator not participating in the decision of the tribunal.  
A party is accorded a further right under Article 13(3) to require the national court 
to decide on the challenge after the arbitral tribunal has ruled on the matter. The 
Model Law provides that such decision by the court is not subject to appeal. A 
party is given thirty days from the date it receives notice from the arbitral tribunal 
rejecting the challenge to commence proceedings in court. It should be noted that 
the court proceedings will be de novo proceedings rather than a review of the deci-
sion of the arbitral tribunal.
In order to ensure the efficacy of arbitral proceedings, Article 13(3) permits the 
arbitral tribunal to continue the proceedings, and even make an award whilst the 
challenge is pending before the national courts. 
In a further attempt to minimise delay to the proceedings and ensure that chal-
lenge is not used for tactical reasons to challenge only unfavourable awards, strict 
time limits for challenge are imposed under the Model Law. In particular, a party 
is required to make a challenge within fifteen days of becoming aware of the 
42 for a discussion regarding the extent to which parties can override or amend the institutional 
rules concerning challenge see Born, Supra Note 14, op. cit., at 1508ff.
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constitution of the tribunal or of any circumstances which give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence43. The Model Law does 
not expressly provide that a failure of the party to commence a challenge within 
this strict time period operates as a waiver. for further discussion on the issue of 
waiver see Section 3. 
ii) Croatian Arbitration Act
The process for challenge under the CAA is substantially the same as under the 
Model Law. The same strict time limits for challenge before the tribunal and the 
national court are provided for in Article 11. Pursuant to Article 43(3), the President 
of the Commercial Court in Zagreb or a judge authorised by the President will rule 
on the challenge.
iii) English Arbitration Act
Under English law an application to the court for removal of an arbitrator may only 
be made after recourse to an arbitral institution or person, if so provided by the 
parties, has been exhausted by the applicant44.  So for example, if the parties have 
opted for arbitration pursuant to ICC Rules, an application for removal will first 
need to be made to the ICC Secretariat and only if such application is unsuccessful 
will the court review the matter. Section 24(5) of the EAA expressly provides that 
the challenged arbitrator is “entitled to appear and be heard by the court before it 
makes its” decision concerning challenge, thereby ensuring that the right to due 
process is also accorded to the arbitrator. 
The default procedure under the EAA is different to that under the Model Law 
and the CAA. EAA’s approach is to be preferred, for the following two reasons. 
first, under the default procedure under the Model Law and the CAA the arbitrator 
whose independence and impartiality is being challenged is (it seems) permitted to 
take part in the deliberations on that very issue. Second, from the administration of 
justice perspective it is better for the issue of challenge to be determined by national 
courts who have no interest in the way the matter is resolved45. 
As under the CAA and Model Law, Section 24(3) permits the tribunal to “continue 
the arbitral proceedings and make an award while an application to the court […] 
43 See Article 13.2.
44 See Section 24(2) of the EAA.
45 Since the default procedure operates only in the absence of the parties’ agreement and as a gen-
eral rule most parties incorporate institutional arbitration rules in their arbitration agreements 
(all of which contain procedure for challenge), the instances in which the default procedure will 
operate in Croatia or any other Model Law country will be very rare in practice.
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is pending”, therefore minimising any delay to the arbitration proceedings arising 
as a result of the challenge. However, unlike the CAA and the Model Law, EAA 
allows for an appeal to be made (with the permission of the court) in respect of a 
decision of the court of first instance. 
Moreover, and importantly, the EAA does not set strict time limits for commencing a 
challenge before national courts. English case law, however, is clear that a party will 
be deemed to have waived its right to challenge unless it has done so promptly46. Spe-
cifically, Section 73 of the EAA provides that a party will lose its right to object unless 
it can show that “at the time he took part ...in the proceedings, he did not know and 
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for the objection”.  
iv) Rules of Arbitration of the Permanent Arbitration Court attached to the 
Croatian Chamber of Economy
Pursuant to Article 16 of the CCC Rules a party wishing to remove an arbitrator 
must submit its request in writing together with reasons to the Permanent Court of 
the CCC within fifteen days of the confirmation of the arbitrator or of becoming 
aware of the circumstances which may give rise to justifiable doubt. Article 16(2) 
of the CCC Rules requires the other side and all members of the tribunal to be 
informed of the request. It is not, however, clear whether such obligation to inform 
rests on the Permanent Court or the party.  
In a departure from the rules of other arbitral institutions, Article 17 provides that 
the decision concerning the removal of an arbitrator will be taken by the authority 
which the parties had previously agreed would appoint the arbitrators or, if no such 
authority had been agreed, by the President of the Permanent Court of the CCC. 
v) ICC Rules of Arbitration
Pursuant to Article 11(1) of the ICC Rules a party wishing to challenge an arbitra-
tor must submit a written statement to the ICC Secretariat specifying the facts and 
circumstances on which the challenge is based. 
Slightly longer time limits for challenge are set under the ICC Rules. To be admis-
sible such statement must be sent within thirty days of receipt of notification of 
the appointment or confirmation of the arbitrator or within thirty days from the 
date such party is informed of the facts and circumstances on which the challenge 
is based47. As such, slightly longer time limits for challenge are set under the ICC 
Rules as compared to the Model Law and CAA.
46 See further discussion in Section 4 and cases referred to footnote 63.
47 See paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the ICC Rules.
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The ICC Court of Arbitration is given the power under Article 11(3) to decide on 
the admissibility and the merits of the challenge. Any such decision can only be 
rendered after the Secretariat has afforded the arbitrator, the other party and other 
members of the tribunal the opportunity to comment in writing on the challenge 
“within a suitable period of time”. Such comments must be communicated to all 
the parties and to the arbitrators.
vi) Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States
The procedure for the disqualification of an arbitrator in an ICSID arbitration is 
set in Article 58 of the ICSID Convention and Article 9 of Rules of Procedure for 
the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings (“ICSID Rules”)48. In 
particular, a party must file a proposal for disqualification, together with reasons, 
to the Secretary General of ICSID. The proposal is then transmitted to all members 
of the arbitral tribunal and the opposing party. If the challenge is directed at a sole 
arbitrator or the majority of arbitrators, the proposal is submitted to the Chairman 
of the Administrative Council of ICSID (“Chairman”) to decide on the challenge. 
The arbitrator whose position is challenged may “without delay upon transmittal 
of the proposal, furnish explanations to the tribunal or Chairman, as the case may 
be”49. If the challenge is directed against one of the arbitrators of a three member 
arbitral tribunal, the decision concerning the disqualification (“Disqualification 
Decision”) is taken by the other two arbitrators “promptly … in the absence of the” 
challenged arbitrator50. 
Unlike other rules, ICSID Rules provide that where other members of the tribu-
nal cannot reach a Disqualification Decision the decision will be taken by the 
Chairman51. Moreover, unlike the other rules, ICSID Rules impose a duty on the 
Chairman to “use his best efforts to take [a] decision within 30 days after he has 
received the proposal” and a duty on the other two arbitrators to take a decision 
“promptly”52. In addition, under the ICSID system the arbitral proceedings must be 
suspended whilst the decision concerning the challenge is pending53. 
48 The ICSID Rules were last amended in 2006. The text of the ICSID Rules is available at http://
www. worldbank.org/icsid.
49 See Rule 9(3) of the ICSID Rules.
50 See Rule 9(4) of the ICSID Rules.
51 See Article 58 of the ICSID Convention and Rule 9(5) of the ICSID Rules.
52 See Rules 9(4) and 9(5) of the ICSID Rules.
53 See Rule 9(6) of the ICSID Rules.
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finally, instead of prescribing a set period of days for the filing of a proposal for 
disqualification, Rule 9(1) requires that the proposal be made “promptly, and in 
any event before the proceedings is declared closed”. The term “promptly” is not 
defined under the ICSID Rules. According to Schreuer “promptly means that the 
proposal to disqualify must be made as soon as the party concerned learns of 
the grounds for a possible disqualification”.54 for further discussion regarding the 
scope of the term “promptly” see the approach taken by the tribunal in the Suez 
Case which is discussed in Section 5.3.2.
f) Conclusion
The analysis in this Section reveals that the grounds and procedure for challenging 
arbitrators are not uniform. Most startlingly, the rules concerning challenge of arbi-
trators in respect of investment arbitrations under ICSID are different as compared 
to those in respect of international commercial arbitrations, with the threshold for 
triggering challenge seemingly significantly higher under the ICSID system. 
III. Arbitrators’ duty to disclose
In order to reduce the risk of a challenge, and to ensure that arbitration meets the 
fundamental requirements of fairness and justice, most institutional rules and na-
tional laws impose a duty on an arbitrator to disclose any conflicts of interest.  In 
this section the nature and the scope of the duty to disclose will be examined under 
the above-mentioned rules and national laws.
a) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and 
Croatian Arbitration Act
Both the CAA and the Model Law provide in their respective Article 12(1) that 
“[w]hen a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as 
an arbitrator, he shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his independence or impartiality. An arbitrator, from the time of his 
appointment and throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose 
any such circumstances to the parties unless they have been previously informed 
of them by him”. 
As such, the duty to disclose is a continuing one requiring an arbitrator to continu-
ously review any circumstances which may arise during the course of the proceed-
ings to determine whether they are likely to give rise to justifiable doubts. The 
same justifiable doubts threshold requirement for challenge is used as the basis for 
disclosure.
54 Schreuer, Supra Note 22, at 1198.  
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b) English Arbitration Act
There is no express obligation to disclose conflicts of interest under the EAA. 
However, English Courts, applying the same standards of impartiality to judges 
and arbitrators, have held that arbitrators have a duty to disclose any matter which 
may give rise to a “real possibility of bias”55. Interestingly, English Courts have 
noted that the level of disclosure which is appropriate depends on the stage in the 
proceedings, with more disclosure being required earlier on in the proceedings56. 
No such distinction is made under the other rules examined herein. Moreover, 
the IBA Guidelines recommend “that disclosure or disqualification … should not 
depend on the particular stage in the proceedings”57. 
c) Rules of Arbitration of the Permanent Arbitration Court attached to the 
Croatian Chamber of Economy
In line with Article 12 of the CAA, Article 14 of the CCC Rules imposes a duty 
on a person approached with possible appointment as an arbitrator to disclose all 
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to his independence or 
impartiality.  However, the rules do not provide that such duty is a continuing one. 
d) ICC Rules of Arbitration
Pursuant to Article 7(2) of the ICC Rules a prospective arbitrator is required to 
sign a statement of independence and disclose in writing to the Secretariat of the 
ICC “any facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into 
question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes of the parties”. Accordingly (and 
importantly), unlike the other rules, the ICC imposes a subjective standard of dis-
closure. The arbitrator is required to disclose any facts or circumstance which the 
parties, rather than a reasonable person, may consider are likely to call into ques-
tion the arbitrator’s independence. An arbitrator taking part in ICC proceedings 
when considering what to disclose is, in other words, required to review the specific 
circumstances of the arbitration in question including, for example the cultural or 
legal background of the parties. This ought to mean, for example, that if one of the 
parties is not familiar with the operations of the English bar, the arbitrator in an ICC 
arbitration would disclose if he/she is a member of the same barristers’ chambers 
as one of the counsel of the parties or one of the other arbitrators. 
In addition, it should be noted that the trigger for the duty to disclose under the 
ICC Rules is not the same as for challenging an arbitrator. Specifically, an arbitra-
55 See for example ASM Shipping case discussed in detail in Section 5.1. 
56 See for example Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Byfield [2000] All ER 65.
57 See paragraph (d) of the Explanation to General Standard 3 of the IBA Guidelines. 
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tor’s duty is broader and requires disclosure of facts and circumstances that might 
call into question his independence in the eyes of the parties whereas, an objective 
standard is used to determine whether he actually lacks independence.
Importantly, under the ICC system the ICC Court of Arbitration is given the ad-
ditional role of confirming arbitrators nominated by the parties. It does so based 
on the information provided by the arbitrator in his statement of independence and 
disclosure. The parties are given the right to comment on the information provided 
by the arbitrator before he/she is confirmed pursuant to Article 7(2) of the ICC 
Rules. As such, ICC arbitrators are effectively vetted before the arbitration com-
mences, thereby minimising delay and cost.  
As under the other rules, the duty to disclose under the ICC Rules is a continuing 
one. Article 7(3) provides that “[a]n arbitrator shall immediately disclose in writing 
to the Secretariat and to the parties any facts or circumstances of a similar nature 
which may arise during the arbitration”.
e) Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States
In response to criticism as to lack of transparency and accountability under the 
ICSID system, the rules concerning disclosure were amended in 2006. Rule 6(2) 
of the ICSID Rules now provides that nominee arbitrators in an ICSID arbitration 
must sign a declaration that they shall “judge fairly as between the parties” and 
attach a statement of “(a) my past and present professional, business and other 
relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other circumstance that might 
cause my reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by a party”. As in 
the case of other rules discussed, the obligation to disclose such relationships and 
circumstances is a continuing one under the ICSID system. 
It should be noted that Rule 6 does not adopt the justifiable doubts requirement of 
the Model Law. The ICSID Secretariat noted in its Discussion Paper on possible 
improvements to the ICSID system that Rule 6(2) “would expand the scope of dis-
closure of arbitrators to include any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to the arbitrator’s reliability for independent judgement”58. However, the 
actual text of Rule 6 does not refer to justifiable doubts.  
In addition, Rule 6 seems to impose a broader duty to disclose on an arbitrator than 
the Model Law, the EAA or the ICC Rules. first, under Rule 6(a) an arbitrator is 
58 See ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, ICSID 
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required to disclose past and present professional business and other relationships 
with the parties, irrespective of whether or not they might cause the reliability of 
his independent judgment to be questioned by the party. Accordingly, it would 
seem that all past relationships with the parties have to be disclosed with no de 
minimis exception applying. Second, the “reliability for independent judgement” 
test in Rule 6(b) for disclosure with respect to “other circumstances” is not only 
broader than the “manifest lack” requirement for triggering challenge under ICSID, 
but also seems broader than the justifiable doubts disclosure requirement under the 
Model Law. 
Malintoppi has criticised the new disclosure standard as “vague” and as possibly 
widening “excessively the scope of the obligation to disclose” in respect of invest-
ment treaty arbitrations59. There has not been to date a case which has explored the 
nature and scope of the new duty to disclose. What is, however, clear, is that Rule 
6 has raised the bar and expanded the duty of disclosure, introducing a threshold 
lower than has been applied by ICSID tribunals in the past, and arguably imposed 
a stricter duty to disclose than exists in the practice of international commercial 
arbitration today. 
IV. Waiver
The ability of parties to waive a conflict is the subject of much debate. The right 
to waive the right to challenge an arbitrator is seen an aspect of party autonomy 
and as essential for promoting the efficacy and finality of arbitration. In particular, 
it is argued that a right to challenge which is not susceptible to waiver may result 
in parties keeping objections up their sleeves and using them only in the event of 
an unfavourable award, thereby undermining the arbitral process. At the same 
time, however, arbitration proceedings must be conducted in a way that meets the 
requirements of fairness and justice. As discussed in Section 1, the right to an im-
partial tribunal is enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR and is regarded as a key rule 
of public policy by most countries in the world. Goudkamp has argued that certain 
conflicts, in particular instances of actual bias, cannot be waived since this would 
undermine the public confidence in the administration of justice60. Endorsing this 
view the IBA Guidelines distinguish between situations which can be waived and 
those that cannot be waived and which no disclosure can cure61. The doctrine of 
waiver and deemed waiver of the right to challenge should, thus, operate so as to 
59 Malintoppi, Supra Note 18, at 826.
60 Goudkamp J., The rule against bias and the doctrine of waiver, [2007] Civil Justice Quarterly 
310.
61 for further details see Section 4 below. 
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strike the right balance between party autonomy and finality on the one hand, and 
justice and fairness on the other hand. 
The discussion in Section 1 shows that most national laws and institutional rules 
limit the parties’ right to challenge an arbitrator. In particular, specific time limits 
within which a challenge must be mounted are set in the Model Law, the CAA and 
the ICC Rules. A failure to commence proceedings within such specific time period 
bars challenge. According to Blackaby and Partasides it is not certain that such a 
procedural bar amounts to a waiver prohibiting a party from raising the issue of a 
challenge of an arbitrator to challenge the award or in enforcement proceedings62. 
There is no such uncertainty under the ICSID system. Although not prescribing 
a specific time period for challenge, the ICSID system requires the party to file a 
proposal for disqualification “promptly” and a failure to do so is deemed, under 
Rule 27 of the ICSID Rules, a waiver by such party of its right to object. There have 
been a number of cases in which ICSID tribunals have dismissed challenges on this 
ground, most recently in the Azurix Case discussed in Section 5.3.3. 
Similarly, English Courts have confirmed that a party is required to make a chal-
lenge prompty even though the EAA does not expressly provide time limits for 
mounting a challenge63. As to the operation of Section 73 of the EAA, the English 
Courts have confirmed that a party is deemed to have waived its right to make a 
challenge at a later date if it fails to make a challenge promptly. 
Importantly, English case law makes clear that to be valid a waiver must be vol-
untary, informed and unequivocal.  The leading authority on the requirement of 
voluntariness is Smith v. Kvaerner Cementation64. In this case the Court of Appeal 
held that the waiver had not been made freely. The claimant’s counsels’ vigorous 
endorsement of the qualities of the judge coupled with the fact that the claim-
ant was not given any information as to when his proceedings would be heard if 
an application for recusal was successfully made the Court of Appeal found had 
unduly burdened the claimant’s decision not to challenge65. The European Court 
of Human Rights held in Pfeifer v. Austria66 that, in the light of the fundamental 
nature of the right to an impartial tribunal, a waiver must be unequivocal and 
62 Blackaby N., Partasides C., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, Oxford University 
Press (5th edition, 2009), at 286.  
63 See Rustal Trading Ltd v. Gill & Duffus SA [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 14, at 19, confirmed in ASM 
Shipping case discussed in Section 5.1.
64 [2006] EWCA Civ 242, [2006] All ER (D) 313.
65 See paras. 37 and 38. for further discussion of this case see Qureshi K., Passing the bias test, 
(2006) New L J 744.
66 (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 692 at 712.
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that, in the absence of an express affirmation by a party that no objection will be 
taken, the longer the time period between the time such party became aware of 
the basis for making an objection and the point at which the objection is ultimately 
made the more likely is it that the party will be held to have intended to waive the 
right to object.
V. Guidelines on challenge and disclosure 
As the discussion in the above Sections reveals, though national laws and arbitra-
tion rules provide standards concerning disclosure, challenge and waiver in case of 
conflict of interest these are not detailed enough. Moreover, there is little uniform-
ity regarding the interpretation and application of these standards by tribunals, 
national courts and arbitral institutions.  
A number of professional associations have sought to achieve greater consistency 
in the application of these rules. The IBA has adopted a code of best practice for 
disclosure and challenge in cases of conflicts of interest67.  It should be noted that 
IBA Guidelines are recommendations only and do not override any applicable 
national law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties. 
a) Duty of Disclosure and grounds for challenge
The IBA Guidelines endorse the “in the eyes of the parties” subjective test for 
disclosure adopted by the ICC68 and the Model Law objective “justifiable doubt” re-
quirement as a basis for challenge69.  Importantly, the IBA Guidelines have sought 
to clarify the interplay between the subjective duty to disclose and the objective 
test for challenge. The Working Group noted that “some objective threshold to the 
subjective test for disclosure should be added” as there are some situations that 
should never lead to disqualification under the objective test70. The IBA Guidelines 
contain a colour coded list of specific situations that do or do not warrant disclosure 
or disqualification of an arbitrator.
67 The AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes also provide a useful 
guideline regarding duty to disclosure and challenge of arbitrators. The text of the AAA/ABA 
Code as revised in 2004 is available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/policy/civillitigation/code-
ofethicsarbitrators2004.pdf. 
68 See General Standard 3(a) of the IBA Guidelines.  The Explanation to General Standard 3(a) of 
the IBA Guidelines provides that “[i]n determining what facts should be disclosed, an arbitrator 
should take into account all circumstances known to him or her, including to the extent known 
the culture and the customs of the country of which the parties are domiciled or nationals”.
69 See General Standard 2 of the IBA Guidelines. 
70 See paragraph 9 in Part II of the IBA Guidelines.
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b) Green List
The Green List lists situations which do not have to be disclosed including that (i) 
the arbitrator has previously published a general opinion (such as in a law review 
article or public lecture) concerning an issue which also arises in the arbitration 
(provided this opinion is not focused on the case that is being arbitrated); (ii) the 
arbitrator’s law firm has acted against one of the parties or an affiliate of one of 
the parties in an unrelated matter without the involvement of the arbitrator; (iii) 
the arbitrator has a relationship with another arbitrator or with the counsel for 
one of the parties through membership in the same professional association or 
social organization; (iv) the arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties or another 
arbitrator have previously served together as arbitrators or as co-counsel; (v) the 
arbitrator has had an initial contact with the appointing party or an affiliate of the 
appointing party (or the respective counsels) prior to appointment, provided this 
contact was limited to the arbitrator’s availability and qualifications to serve or to 
the names of possible candidates for a chairperson and did not address the merits 
or procedural aspects of the dispute; and (vi) the arbitrator holds an insignificant 
amount of shares in one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties, which 
is publicly listed. 
c) Orange List
The orange List lists specific situations in which the parties might reasonably have 
doubts about the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence including that (i) the 
arbitrator has within the past three years served as counsel for one of the parties or 
an affiliate of one of the parties or has previously advised or been consulted by the 
party or an affiliate of the party making the appointment in an unrelated matter, 
provided that the arbitrator and the party or the affiliate of the party have no ongo-
ing  relationship; (ii) the arbitrator has within the past three years served as counsel 
against one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties in an unrelated matter; 
(iii) the arbitrator has within the past three years been appointed as arbitrator on 
two or more occasions by one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties; (iv) 
the arbitrator’s law firm has within the past three years acted for one of the parties 
or an affiliate of one of the parties in an unrelated matter without the involvement 
of the arbitrator; (v)  the arbitrator currently serves, or has served within the past 
three years, as arbitrator in another arbitration on a related issue involving one of 
the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties; (vi) the arbitrator’s law firm is cur-
rently rendering services to one of the parties or to an affiliate of one of the parties 
without creating a significant commercial relationship and without the involvement 
of the arbitrator; (vii) the arbitrator and another arbitrator are lawyers in the same 
law firm; (viii) the arbitrator and another arbitrator or the counsel for one of the 
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parties are members of the same barristers’ chambers; and (ix) the arbitrator was 
within the past three years a partner of, or otherwise affiliated with, another arbitra-
tor or any of the counsel in the same arbitration.  
Two general observations should be made. first, that in the explanatory notes to 
the IBA Guidelines the Working Group noted that the “three year cut-off period 
is a rule of thumb only and that individual circumstances may warrant a shorter 
or a longer period of time71. Second, that according to the IBA Guidelines the fact 
that the activities of the arbitrator’s law firm involve one of the parties does not 
“automatically give rise to a source of conflict or a reason for the arbitrator to make 
a disclosure. The nature, timing and scope of the work undertaken by a law firm, 
should be reasonably considered in each individual case”72.
d) Red List
finally, the Red List contains a list of situations which give rise to doubt as to an 
arbitrator’s impartiality and independence. This list is divided into situations with 
respect to which challenge cannot be waived by the parties and those in respect of 
which it can be waived. 
Importantly, a challenge in respect of the following situations cannot be waived: (i) 
where there is “identity between a party and the arbitrator, or the arbitrator is a legal 
representative of an entity that is a party in the arbitration; (ii) the arbitrator is a 
manager, director or member of the supervisory board, or has a similar controlling 
influence in one of the parties; (iii) the arbitrator has a significant financial interest 
in one of the parties or the outcome of the case; (iv) the arbitrator regularly advises 
the appointing party or an affiliate of the appointing party, and the arbitrator or his 
or her firm derives a significant financial income therefrom”73. 
The waivable Red List includes the following situations: (i) the arbitrator holds 
shares, either directly or indirectly, in one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the 
parties that is privately held; (ii) a close family member of the arbitrator has a sig-
nificant financial interest in the outcome of the dispute; (iii) the arbitrator currently 
represents or advises one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties; (iv) 
the arbitrator is a lawyer in the same law firm as the counsel to one of the parties; 
and (v) the arbitrator regularly advises the appointing party or an affiliate of the 
appointing party, but neither the arbitrator nor his or her firm derives a significant 
financial income therefrom.
71 See paragraph 7 in Part II of the IBA Guidelines.
72 See paragraph (a) of the Explanation to General Standard 6 of the IBA Guidelines. 
73 See page 20 of the IBA Guidelines.
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e) Waiver
The IBA Guidelines imposes a duty on an arbitrator to disclose all situations re-
ferred to in the orange and Red Lists. It also provides that parties can waive and, 
unless the challenge is made within the strict time periods prescribed in national 
law and/or institutional rules, will be deemed to have waived the right to challenge 
if circumstances listed in orange and waivable Red List are disclosed by the ar-
bitrator. The situations listed in the non-waiveable Red List cannot be waived, no 
disclosure can cure them and no time limits for challenge apply to them.
f) Conclusion
IBA Guidelines have been the subject of much discussion and criticism for not 
covering, for example, non-executive directorships, adopting a relatively lax ap-
proach to disclosure of relationships between counsel and arbitrators and between 
co-arbitrators, as well as for a failure to impose a duty of disclosure on counsel74. 
However, it must be observed that IBA Guidelines never sought to provide an ex-
haustive list of situations which may give rise to conflict and duty to disclose, or to 
serve as a substitute for scrutiny of the facts in question. 
Despite their shortcomings, the IBA Guidelines have achieved a measure of ac-
ceptance and are a useful aide for arbitrators faced with issues of pre-appointment 
disclosure, as well as to national courts and tribunals dealing with challenges of 
arbitrators. In fact, as will be discussed in Section 5, the IBA Guidelines have been 
referred to by national courts and tribunals in some recent cases.
VI. Recent cases of challenge
The last few years have seen a significant rise in the number of challenges brought 
against arbitrators. In this section recent reported cases concerning challenge in 
a few selected countries, as well as under the ICSID system, are reviewed to see 
how the above rules for disclosure and challenge are applied in practice at present.
a) England: ASM Shipping Ltd of India v. TTMI Ltd of England75
The facts before the English Court in this case where as follows. Before the hearing 
in the arbitration, but after certain preliminary issues had been decided, the claim-
ant’s principal witness told their solicitors that the chairman of the tribunal had a 
close connection with the other side’s solicitors including in a case in which serious 
allegations relating to disclosure were made against that witness. It also transpired 
74 Veeder is quoted by Trackman as saying that the IBA Guidelines are encouraging the “malign 
practice” of new tactical challenges to arbitrators.  See Trakman, Supra Note 31, op. cit., at 126. 
75 [2005] EWHC 2238 (Comm), [2005] All ER (D) 271.
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that some seven months before the hearing the chairman had been involved in 
a disclosure exercise against the claimant in the matter in which he now found 
himself sitting as an arbitrator. The claimant objected to the chairman continuing 
to sit as an arbitrator. However, after the arbitrator refused to recuse himself the 
claimant did not apply to the English Court to remove him pursuant to Section 24 
of the EAA. It was only after the tribunal issued an unfavourable interim award 
that the claimant sought to set aside the award on the grounds of the chairman’s 
lack of impartiality.
Mr Justice Morison applied the House of Lords “real possibility” test in Porter v. 
Magill76 and held that the chairman should have recused himself. Since the arbitral 
proceedings were still on-going his Lordship ordered the chairman not to continue 
sitting as an arbitrator even though no specific application had been made to re-
move him. His Lordship, however, refused to set aside the interim award on the 
basis that the claimant had waived its right to object to the chairman’s past partici-
pation in the arbitral proceedings by failing to challenge the chairman after he had 
refused to recuse himself.  
It should be noted that this is the first case in which the English Court referred to 
the IBA Guidelines. However, it did not find them helpful in determining whether 
or not the particular relationship in question crossed the real possibility of bias 
threshold and noted that the lists contained therein were not comprehensive. 
Shortly after the judgment was handed down by Mr Justice Morison the claimant 
applied to the Court challenging the other two members of the tribunal pursuant 
to Section 2477. The claimant argued that when one member of a tribunal is found 
to be partial, it automatically follows that the whole tribunal is similarly affected. 
Accepting for the sake of argument that the witness would have been an important 
witness for the claimant in the remainder of the arbitration, Mr Justice Smith held 
that any objection to the two remaining arbitrators could only be made on the basis 
that there was a risk that they would be other than impartial because they had been 
influenced by discussions with the chairman concerning that witness. Based on the 
chairman’s evidence that he could not recall anything relating to the previous case 
in which he had acted as counsel, his Lordship found that it could not be accepted 
that a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was any real 
possibility that there had been discussions between the chairman and the other ar-
bitrators that might improperly influence their assessment of the evidence tendered 
by the witness. In any event, his Lordship held that the claimant had waived its right 
to challenge the other arbitrators. 
76 for further detail see discussion in Section 1.3.  
77 [2007] EWHC 1513 (Comm).
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b) Belgium: Eureko v The Republic of Poland78
This recent decision of the Belgium Court of Appeal has been widely reported 
since it concerned a challenge to the former president of the International Court of 
Justice. The challenge was brought before the Belgium Court, since Belgium was 
the seat of the arbitration. As in the case of the Model Law and the CAA, Section 
1690 of the Belgian Judiciary Code provides that an arbitrator can be challenged 
when circumstances raise justifiable doubts concerning the arbitrator’s impartiality 
or independence. In mounting its challenge, Poland asserted that Judge Schwebel 
was, together with a law firm, acting as counsel for an unrelated company (“A”) in 
another arbitration against Poland. 
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal noted that: (i) although Schwebel had 
worked alongside the law firm in a number of unrelated cases, it was not established 
that he had acted as counsel to A; (ii) although other members of the law firm acted 
as counsel to A in an arbitration against Poland, it did not consider that the disposi-
tion these members may have had against Poland transferred to Schwebel; and (iii) 
Schwebel was not a member of the law firm even though he shared their offices. In 
view of the above, the Court of Appeal held that it was immaterial that Schwebel 
failed to disclose his relationship with the law firm, and concluded that there were 
insufficient grounds to raise justifiable doubts about his impartiality. 
c) ICSID Cases
In this section three recent published cases concerning challenges under the ICSID 
system are reviewed: (i) Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. The Republic of Slov-
enia79 (“HEP Case”); (ii) Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and 
Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic80 (“Suez 
Case”) and (iii) Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic81(“Azurix Case”). 
78 Brussels Court of Appeal of 29 october 2007, R.G. 2007/AR/70.
79 ISCID Case No ARB/05/24, Tribunal’s Ruling regarding the participation of David Mildon QC in 
further stages of the proceedings of 6 May 2008, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
frontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC950_En&caseId=C69.
80 ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, AWG Group v. The Argentine Republic (UNCITRAL), Decision 
on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, 22 october 2007, 
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/frontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=
showDoc&docId=DC689_En&caseId=C18.
81 ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Re-
public, dated 1 September 2009, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/frontServlet?re
questType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1171_En&caseId=C5.
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i) HEP Case
A week before the hearing on the merits in this case, Slovenia’s lawyers provided 
the secretary of the tribunal with a list of persons who would be attending the hear-
ing. The list included an English barrister from the same chambers as the chairman 
of the tribunal. Immediately following such disclosure the claimant, pointing to 
the IBA Guidelines, sought information concerning the relationship between Slov-
enia’s barrister counsel and the chairman, insisting it be told when the barrister had 
been engaged and what his role would be at the hearing. The claimant emphasised 
that “had [it] known at the outset that the lawyer proposed to be Chairman and one 
of Slovenia’s lawyers were members of the same Chambers, [it] would not have 
consented to that lawyer’s appointment as [Chairman]”82. Slovenia declined to pro-
vide any information, asserting that it owed no such duty of disclosure. Moreover, 
the respondent, echoing the position adopted by DAC and discussed in Section 1.2, 
asserted that the fact that the counsel and the chairman were members of the same 
English barristers’ chambers could not cause justified concern as to the chairman’s 
independence and impartiality since such practice is common and permissible un-
der English standards of professional ethics.
Notably the claimant did not submit a proposal for the disqualification of the chair-
man pursuant to Article 58 of the ICSID Convention83. Had it done so, the proposal 
would have been considered by the two remaining arbitrators without the partici-
pation of the chairman. During the proceedings both parties agreed that they did 
not wish the chairman to resign, and asked the tribunal to make its ruling taking 
this into account. The cost and delay implications of such resignation seem to have 
borne heavily on everyone’s mind. 
Referring extensively to the IBA Guidelines, the tribunal held that the combined 
effect of (i) the counsel for one party being from the same chambers in which the 
chairman was a door tenant; (ii) the claimant’s unfamiliarity with English barris-
ters’ chambers as it was a Croatian company; (iii) Slovenia’s conscious decision 
not to disclose the involvement of the barrister as soon as he was engaged; (iv) the 
tardiness of its disclosure (just a week before the hearing); and (v) the insistent re-
fusal to provide further information, endangered the legitimacy of arbitral process 
and created distrust84. 
The tribunal emphasised the fact that the arbitrator and counsel are from the same 
barristers chambers was amongst the situations which fell within the orange List 
82 See HEP Case, Supra Note 80, para 6. 
83 for discussion of the grounds and procedure for disqualification under ICSID Convention see 
Section 1.5.6.
84 See HEP Case, Supra Note 80, op. cit., para.25-30.
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and, therefore, had to be disclosed by the party or the arbitrator85. However, the tri-
bunal sought to down play the significance of its decision by noting that as a general 
rule barristers from the same chambers are not precluded from being involved as 
counsel and arbitrator in the same matter, and that much will turn on the specific 
facts of the case in question86.
ii) Suez Case
This is one of several ICSID cases in which Argentina has challenged the independ-
ent judgement of the same arbitrator87. In this case Argentina sought to disqualify 
one of the arbitrators on the basis that she had been a member of the ICSID tribunal 
in the Compañía Case which had rendered an award against Argentina. It claimed 
that the decision in that case was “so flawed, particularly in its findings of fact and 
its appraisal of the evidence, that [the arbitrator’s] very participation in that decision 
… reveals a prima facie lack of impartiality of the above mentioned arbitrator”88. 
Referring to their duty to consider Argentina’s proposal for disqualification 
“promptly” as per Rule 9(4) of the ICSID Rules and having given the arbitrator 
and the other side an opportunity to make submissions, the other two members 
(“Members”) of the tribunal issued a Disqualification Decision ten days after Ar-
gentina submitted its proposal.  
The Members rejected Argentina’s proposal on the basis that it was untimely and 
that Argentina was deemed to have waived its right to challenge as per Rule 27 
of the ICSID Rules. Acknowledging that the ICSID Rules do not “specify a defi-
nite, quantifiable deadline beyond which a challenge is not to be considered”, the 
Members held that the requirement of Rule 9(1) to file the proposal “promptly” 
means that the proposal must be made as soon as the party concerned learns of 
85 Paragraph 4.5 of the Background Information issued by the Working Group clarifies that bar-
risters’ chambers should be treated in the same way as law firms. Paragraph 3.3.2 of the orange 
List lists “an arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties are from the same law firm” as one of 
the situations which may give rise to justifiable doubt as to impendence or impartiality of an 
arbitrator. 
86 for further discussion of the case see Qureshi K., A double Act, New Law Journal, May 2009, 
available at http://www.newlaw journal.co.uk/nlj/content/double-act.
87 The other cases include EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Partici-
paciones Argentinas S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Challenge 
Decision Regarding Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 25 June 2008 (not published). All of 
the challenges to date have been unsuccessful. At the time of writing this article the Annulment 
Proceedings in respect of Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. 
The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case no ARB/97/3 (“Compañia Case”) were still pending.
88 See Suez Case, Supra Note 81, para. 13.
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the grounds for a possible disqualification89. Accordingly, the Members held that 
“Argentina’s delay of fifty-three days in submitting its Proposal, a document of just 
23 pages, does  not constitute acting promptly given the nature of the case, and the 
fact that hearings on the merits were scheduled to take place within two weeks of 
of the submission of its proposal”90. 
Having dismissed Argentina’s proposal on procedural grounds, the Members went 
on to consider the substance of Argentina’s proposal. In particular, the Members 
held that the “the concepts of independence and impartiality, though related, are 
often seen as distinct” and noted that “independence relates to the lack of rela-
tions with a party that might influence an arbitrator’s decision” whilst impartiality 
“concerns the absence of a bias or predisposition toward one of the parties”91. The 
Members noted that the grounds of challenge were unusual and, having reviewed 
the award in the Compañía Case, held that there is “no evidence from its text of a 
lack of impartiality or independence” by the arbitrator92. The fact that the award 
was unanimous and had been rendered by three distinguished arbitrators, includ-
ing one appointed by Argentina, was underlined as an important factor in the 
Members’ reasoning. 
In conclusion, the Members held that the fact that the same arbitrator had made a 
determination in one case against a party did not mean that she could not decide 
another case impartially, even though both cases arose out of the privatisation of 
Argentina’s sewage and water systems93.
iii) Azurix Case
This case is the first case in which an Ad Hoc Committee ruled on whether an 
ICSID award can be annulled on the basis of an arbitrator’s manifest lack of inde-
pendent judgement. 
In this case Argentina had submitted a proposal for the disqualification of the presi-
dent of the tribunal on the following grounds: (i) the president was employed as a 
consultant to the law firm which was representing a party in another case where 
the law firm had appointed as arbitrator one of the counsel of the claimant; (ii) the 
president had been part of the laws firm’s team in that case; (iii) the law firm in 
which the president was employed had advised the claimant on other matters; and 
89 Ibid., para. 23.
90 Ibid., para. 26.
91 Ibid., para. 29.
92 Ibid., para.34.
93 Ibid., para. 37.
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(iv) the law firm, but not the president, advised several parties in matters against 
the claimant’s parent company. 
The Ad Hoc Committee reviewed the Disqualification Decision of the unchallenged 
members of the tribunal and found that Argentina’s proposal had been rejected on 
two counts: (i) that Argentina failed to promptly state its objections as required by 
Rule 27 of the ICSID Rules (Argentina had not proposed disqualification until some 
eight months after it became aware of the facts on which it based its proposal for 
disqualification); and (ii) in any event, that the fact that the arbitrator was a member 
of the law firm which appointed one of the counsel of the claimant in an unrelated 
arbitration was not enough to establish manifest lack of independent judgement94.  
The Ad Hoc Committee noted that at the time of his appointment the president had 
disclosed that the law firm in which he was an advisor was representing parties 
against the claimant’s parent company and that neither party objected. It further 
noted that the counsel of the claimant had informed Argentina that he had been 
appointed as arbitrator in an unrelated case by the law firm in which the president 
was a member and that the president had been, but had since then ceased to be, part 
of the law firm’s legal team in this case. 
furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee held that annulment proceedings do not al-
low Argentina a de novo review of its challenge to the arbitrator95. The Committee 
stated that Article 52 of the ICSID Convention required it to review the Disquali-
fication Decision only for manifest error, and held that no there was no basis for 
concluding that such error had been made. 
VII.  Concluding remarks 
By way of conclusion, the following remarks and observations are made concern-
ing the challenge of arbitrators and related duties to disclose.
first, it would seem, as confirmed by the three recent ICSID cases reviewed in 
Section 5, that the threshold for a challenge of an arbitrator is higher in respect of 
an investment treaty arbitration than an international commercial arbitration. It can 
be argued that public interest concerns mandate that the threshold for challenge 
in respect of investment arbitrations should be, at the very least, the same as in 
respect of international commercial arbitrations, if not lower. Unlike other forms 
of international arbitrations, investment arbitration is a method of public law adju-
dication whereby arbitrators adjudicate on disputes between individuals and states 
94 Azurix Case, Supra Note 81, para. 35 and 26.
95 Ibid, para. 273.
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regarding the legality of regulatory and sovereign acts of states96. As such, there is 
an even greater need to ensure the integrity and transparency of such arbitrations. 
There must exist a robust system of challenge in place which puts the impartiality 
and independence of the arbitrators beyond doubt. 
Second, it is of concern that ICSID arbitral tribunals are more reluctant to dis-
qualify arbitrators than national courts. Moreover, given the public law nature of 
ICSID arbitrations, its procedure for challenge (whereby the unchallenged arbitra-
tors decide upon the challenge of their fellow arbitrator) is wholly inappropriate. 
The fact that under the ICSID system parties are not permitted recourse to national 
courts for a de novo hearing regarding the challenge (as is the case with respect to 
international commercial arbitrations) is another reason for the ICSID disqualifica-
tion procedure to be changed. In this respect the decision of the AD Hoc Commit-
tee in the Azurix Case not to examine the merits of the challenge claim but simply 
review the Disqualification Decision for manifest error is of particular concern. 
for these reasons, it would be preferable if a neutral institution or an ad hoc body 
was made responsible for the disqualification process, and for the members of such 
body not to be permitted to appear either as counsels or arbitrators in ICSID cases. 
Third, as the discussion in this article has shown, the national laws and institutional 
rules at present only impose a duty to disclose on arbitrators. The IBA Guidelines 
go a step further by recommending that the duty to disclose also be imposed on 
the parties. However, the decision in the HEP Case highlights the need for such a 
duty to be imposed on counsel as well. In that case, the arbitrator was not aware 
of the conflict of interest until Slovenia’s counsel submitted the list of counsel 
which would take part in the hearing. Slovenia’s counsel, however, had known of 
the potential conflict for some time but asserted that no duty of disclosure rested 
on the counsel or the party under the ICSID Rules. Calls for codes of conduct for 
arbitrators and counsel in arbitrations to be adopted must be heeded in order to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the international arbitration system. 
fourth, the time may have come for the standards of independence and impartiality 
to be defined “specifically for the international arbitration context and independ-
ent of the national judicial standards”97. Virtually all countries apply the same 
standards for judges and arbitrator. Some exceptions are Sweden, which defines 
arbitrator standards as stricter than that of judges, and Germany, which permits 
more contact between arbitrators and parties than is allowed between parties and 
judges98.  Rogers argues that the standards of independence and impartiality of 
96 Van Harten G., Investment Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford University Press (2007), at
97 Rogers C., Regulating International Arbitrators, (2005) 41 Stanford J. of Int. Law, 53, at 57.
98 Rogers, Ibid. 
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arbitrators should reflect the specific features of the role of arbitrators rather than 
simply being “a watered-down version of the mythological “impartial” judge” and 
proposes a framework for devising such standards99.
finally, the rise in the number of challenges should be seen by the international 
arbitral community as an opportunity to address the concerns of the public that 
the world of international arbitration is an exclusive club where the interests of 
the members take priority over those of the parties and the society at large100. The 
future of international arbitration depends on ensuring the integrity of the process. 
The quality of justice that arbitration affords to parties must not be inferior to that 
accorded by national courts. 
99 Rogers, op. cit., at 59.
100 Dezalay  Y., Garth B., Dealing in Virtue, The University of Chicago Press (1996), Chapter 1.
